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§ 1. Introduction
The performance stage in public procurement is crucial for achieving projects 
awarded after going through numerous meticulous legal requirements. It is 
the moment when public money is exchanged against works, goods or services, 
and the fit between what has been promised and what is delivered is exam-
ined. It is the moment when all the uncertainty surrounding the contracting 
stage may materialise as risks to be borne by one of the parties. It is also the 
moment when public money is injected into the economy and thus procure-
ment’s contribution to economic growth materialises. For instance, public 
procurement currently amounts to ca. 16 % of the GDP in Europe,2 which 
includes 14 % to 16 % in the United Kingdom,3 14 % in Belgium, 15 % in 
France and 21 % in the Netherlands (in 2013).4
Moreover, the performance stage in public procurement is the moment when 
public authorities and their contractors may want to depart from their orig-
inal commitment. Between the moment when a public official dreams of 
opening a magnificent bridge or a state-of-the-art hospital and the actual 
delivery of this project, with the management of road works and tolls or 
intakes and discharges of patients, years may pass, budgets may soar. For 
instance, the Jubilee Line extension in the London Underground was delivered 
(1) Senior Lecturer, University of Essex (United Kingdom); Maître de Conférences, Université 
libre de Bruxelles (ULB-Belgium). Any comments on this paper would be very welcome at the 
following email addresses: ymarique@ulb.ac.be or ymarique@essex.ac.uk. The ideas developed in 
this paper were discussed with French colleagues: Professor Hélène Hoepffner, Professor Grégory 
Kalflèche, and Professor François Lichère. My thanks go to them for their kind promptings. These 
discussions have been made possible thanks to a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research 
grant. Thank you also to the reviewers and to Professor Lorna Woods for their supportive 
comments on drafts of this paper. All errors remain mine.
(2) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/index_en.htm.
(3) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-sustainable- 
development/2010-to-2015-government-policy-sustainable-development.
(4) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4215081ec042.pdf?expires=1454953490
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=CE9FC9A3687D90A21988CB5807128B24.
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two years late and cost £1.4bn more than the original estimates.5 One option 
could be to fine-tune the legal procedures available for procurers to tender 
works, supplies and services. Another option is to understand how public 
procurement is actually performed and what causes these delays and over-
budgets: for instance, public authorities may alter their requirements for a 
hospital and ask for a new floor with new services during the construction 
phase. In another instance, private contractors may seek to obtain a different 
use for spaces in an urban redevelopment project, ensuring that more commer-
cial stores will bring additional profit to the project.
Until recently, the EU Directives mentioned very little about the actual perfor-
mance of public contracts as economic transactions. Indeed, the role of the 
law in fostering or hindering competition when public bodies ask economic 
actors to provide them with goods, works or services currently deeply divides 
legal scholarship. On the one hand, proponents of an extended reach for 
competition, such as Albert Sanchez-Graells, argue that European and domestic 
public procurement distorts competition and the normal functioning of the 
markets as both private actors and/or public authorities may collude among 
themselves.6 On the other hand, Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik contend 
that public procurement directives have limited purposes, such as prohibiting 
discrimination, implementing transparency and removing barriers to access to 
markets. Other purposes, such as providing value for money or defining shared 
standards for goods and services, are not included in the powers of the EU, 
and should thus only be pursued by Member States.7 Therefore these discus-
sions are closely connected to debates about the freedom that Member States 
retain to decide the objectives that they want to pursue with the purchasing 
and economic powers that are attached to government contracts (such as 
developing their own industrial policy, value for money, etc.).
The new EU Directive 2014/24 brings arguments supporting both sides of this 
discussion.8 Yet, this debate does not stop with the award phase of procure-
ment. Under the 2004 EU Directives, this part of the contractual relationship 
was very much left as falling under the sole remit of the Member States, 
(5) HM Treasury, Public Private Partnerships: The Government Approach, 2000, p. 18.
(6) A. Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Hart, 2011).
(7) S.  Arrowsmith, “The purpose of the EU procurement directives: Ends, means, and the 
implications for national regulatory space for commercial and horizontal procurement policies”, 
(2011-12) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legl Studies pp. 1-47. P. Kunzlik, “Neoliberalism 
and the European Public Procurement Regime”, (2013) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies pp. 283-356.
(8) For a restatement of their respective theses after the 2014 Directives see A. Sanchez Graells, 
Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2015, 2nd edn) esp. 
author’s note to the second edition, and P. Kunzlik, “The 2014 public procurement package – 
One-step forward and two back for green and social procurement ?”, contribution in this edited 
collection (pp. 139-196).
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leaving them to organise performance as they wished.9 The ECJ, however, has 
highlighted that some changes triggered the re-opening of the contract to a 
competitive procedure,10 so that awarding entities do not seek to circumvent 
the application of the strict award procedures by changing key features such 
as the price, duration, subject-matter etc. of the contract once the private 
contractor has been selected. Allowing such bypassing in bad faith would 
deprive the award process requirements of their efficiency.11
The new EU Directive seeks to consolidate the ECJ case law on this very 
point.12 The assumption underlying article 72 Directive 2014/24, the provi-
sion dealing with changes during the performance of public contracts, is thus 
that public authorities and private contractors are likely to collude and seek 
to stray away from a contract resulting from the competition, transparency 
and non-discrimination rules set by the EU Directives for the procurement 
process.13 The solution reached in article 72 Directive 2014/24 is particularly 
ambiguous about cases when changes trigger a re-tendering requirement. The 
extent to which public authorities can be trusted with seeking adaptations to 
their contracts without creating undue advantages for their private contrac-
tors is uncertain. However, this paper argues that renegotiations during 
contractual performance need to be seen as normal in the ordinary life of a 
contract and should not be over-regulated. Discretion, cooperation and 
control between the contracting parties should be given more careful atten-
tion. Therefore, this paper argues that competition should be limited to excep-
tional cases. Otherwise, competition causes more trouble than is reasonable 
for balancing the economic interests and public interests involved in public 
procurement. With this departure point in mind, cooperation between the 
European Union and the Member States regarding regulating the performance 
stage with appropriate techniques should be organised according to the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity.
After identifying the specificities connected to the Pressetext case law in § 2, 
this paper explains the ambiguity in the solution provided in Article 72 (§ 3). 
(9) There were only very limited exceptions to this silence in the EU Directive prior to 2014: e.g., 
Art. 31 (4) 2004 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114.
(10) Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Austria (C-454/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4401 (ECJ).
(11) M.  Comba, “Principles of EU law relevant to the performance of public contracts”, in 
M. Trybus, R. Caranta and G. Edelstam (eds), EU Public Contract Law – Public Procurement 
and Beyond (Bruylant, 2014), pp. 317-337, spec. p. 322.
(12) Recital [2] Directive 2014/24 on public procurement [2014] OJ L094/65.
(13) This paper only deals with article 72 Directive 2014/24. Article 90 Directive 2014/23 on the 
award of concession contracts [2014] OJ L094/1 and article 89 Directive 2014/25 on procurement 
by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2014] OJ L 94/243 
are nearly a cut and paste of article 72, with only a little difference that has no relevance for the 
discussions in this paper.
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It goes on to discuss the limits of competition for policing contractual changes 
during the contract’s lifetime in § 4, mapping the ground for § 5 to explore 
alternative ways to achieve a better understanding of contractual changes. 
The Conclusion suggests that Article 72 relies on a distorted notion of compe-
tition: a more sophisticated toolbox for assessing when contracting authori-
ties can usefully resort to competition needs to be carefully developed in the 
future in order to develop a genuine European market for public contracts.
§ 2. Extending competition to open the market 
to competitors
The procurement stage and performance stage maintain a very complex rela-
tionship. They are connected; they are also miles apart. They are connected 
because the efficient and correct performance of a contract is only possible if 
the contract is well thought through during the procurement phase. They are 
connected because all the efforts invested in awarding and getting the most 
economically advantageous bid are only worthwhile if the performance 
confirms the promises of the contract. Efficiency is thus a feature common to 
both stages.
However, the procurement and performance stages are also miles apart. 
Procurement requires the public authority to select its contracting party from 
among a pool of competing bids, while the performance stage is, or at least 
can be, about developing a working relationship and cooperation between the 
public authority and the private contractor in order to ensure the success of a 
project to the benefit of its users. Procurement and performance are also miles 
apart because the procurement stage is mainly an “abstract thinking” exercise 
(by lawyers, by engineers, by architects, by officials etc.) while the perfor-
mance stage involves a large portion of “concrete doing” (constructing, deliv-
ering, providing, addressing concrete obstacles etc.).
The thinking exercise in the procurement process may be focused on securing 
a contract at a given time, with limited visibility on the future of this contract 
once the contract is agreed. In the concrete doing of the performance stage, 
strict adherence to the contractual terms may be an option, in as much as 
strict adherence and perfect control over compliance can ever be possible. 
Another option could include on-going adaptations: regular variations 
following discussions between the parties may be accepted as natural and 
ordinary features of contractual life. The gap between procurement and 
performance is often clear as different teams are responsible for the procure-
ment stage and the performance of the contract, especially on the public 
authority side. In short, the procurement phase is very much governed by 
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competition, transparency and non-discrimination; the performance phase 
brings into the picture other logics, especially of cooperation and control 
between the public party and its contracting partners. How can the two stages 
of procurement and performance be best articulated?
Historically, the relevant EU Directives focus on the procurement stage and 
leave the performance stage very much unchartered, with some limited excep-
tions.14 However, this has led to difficulties: in its Pressetext decision decided 
in 2008, the European Court of Justice – as it was then – mapped the limits 
of contractual changes in the performance stage of public contracts15 and 
decided that competition and the general principles of EU law (transparency 
and non-discrimination especially) applied when contractual changes 
expressed parties’ intention to renegotiate contracts.16 This ECJ decision is 
very pedagogic as it explains the justification for this solution, defines “mate-
rial” modifications and illustrates this concept before applying it in a sophis-
ticated way to the circumstances of the cases. Yet, uncertainty and questions 
remained around the crucial notion of “material changes”.
The facts of this case arose in 1994, when, prior to joining the European 
Union, Austria signed a contract with APA, the main Austrian operator of 
new agencies. This contract allowed the Austrian government to access a 
range of services provided by APA (such as historical information, previous 
press releases and use of services allowing the dissemination of press releases). 
The contract was for an unlimited time-period. Over time, three types of 
changes were made to the contract: changes to the contracting party, changes 
to the price and changes to the terms related to the duration. Due to all these 
changes, a newcomer in the media landscape, Pressetext, challenged the 
contract and sought to have it retendered. In its preliminary ruling, the ECJ 
distinguishes between substantial (or material) and non-substantial (or non-
material) changes for the first time. Parties may bring non-substantial changes 
to their contracts without any duty to retender the contracts. When substan-
tial changes are carried out, however, a duty to reopen the tendering process 
arises.
The ECJ starts by connecting amendments to contracts with the need to 
ensure that this technique is not used to circumvent the transparency of proce-
dures and equal treatment of tenderers required during the tendering process. 
Therefore any amendments which would make the contract “materially 
different in character from the original contract and, therefore, such as to 
(14) E.g.: Art.  31 (4) 2004 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ 
L134/114.
(15) Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Austria (C-454/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4401 (ECJ).
(16) Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Austria (C-454/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4401 (ECJ).
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demonstrate the intention of the parties to renegotiate the essential terms of 
that contract” would be considered as a new awarding of the contract.17
The ECJ then illustrates such “material” amendments with three cases. A first 
type of “material” change is an amendment which“introduces conditions 
which, had they been part of the initial award procedure, would have allowed 
for the admission of tenderers other than those initially admitted or would 
have allowed for the acceptance of a tender other than the one initially 
accepted”.18 A second illustration of a “material” amendment is an amend-
ment “extend[ing] the scope of the contract considerably to encompass services 
not initially covered”.19A third illustration is the case of an amendment 
“chang[ing] the economic balance of the contract in favour of the contractor 
in a manner which was not provided for in the terms of the initial contract”.20
In these illustrations of material changes, the ECJ tries to balance two 
approaches. On the one hand, it seeks to pinpoint objective elements that 
could help demonstrate that there has been an intention to renegotiate the 
contract: i.e. potential different economic partners available, changes in the 
subject-matter of the contact, changes in the economic balance of a contract. 
The subjective intention of the parties, difficult to grasp clearly from outside, 
is thus made objective if one of these three cases happens: then, a different 
contract exists and a new tendering process is required. On the other hand, 
the ECJ seeks to give some leeway about how its approach needs to be inter-
preted: the three cases mentioned are only illustrations, some concepts need to 
be interpreted according to the circumstances of each case (e.g. “consider-
ably”, retrospective construction of the potential competition, “economic 
balance” etc.).
In this vein, the ECJ shows a flexible approach to interpreting the intention of 
parties to renegotiate contracts when it looks at the three types of changes 
arising in the Pressetext case: substitution of the contracting party, changes in 
the price and changes to the termination clause.
In relation to the substitution of the contracting party, the ECJ finds that the 
arrangement under the specific case circumstances (including that the new 
contracting party is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the initial contracting party 
and that the initial contracting partners remain jointly and severally liable 
with the new contracting party) amounts only to an internal re-organisation 
of the contracting party. There is thus no fundamental modification of the 
initial contract.21 The ECJ here shows a benevolent approach, looking at 
(17) Pressetext, at [34].
(18) At [35].
(19) At [36].
(20) At [37].
(21) At [45].
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the economic reality of the substitution and not at the changes in the legal 
entities.
In relation to changes in the price, the ECJ sets out that “the price is an impor-
tant condition of a public contract”.22 In this case, the changes (conversion of 
prices to euros without changing their intrinsic amount; secondly the conver-
sion of prices to euros entailing a small reduction in their intrinsic amount 
and, thirdly, the reformulation of a price indexation clause) are very small and 
should not be considered material changes.
In relation to the changes to the termination clause, and especially the waiving 
of the right to terminate the contract for a period of three years, the ECJ 
considers again that in the circumstances of the case (i.e. the absence of real 
risks of termination), the changes do not amount to a new award of the 
contract.23
The Pressetext solution, however, needs to be explained within the specificities 
of the case and the limits of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. The ECJ cannot invent 
rules and principles out of the blue and had to deal with a problematic situa-
tion where the risks of limiting competition due to the specific circumstances 
of the case were real due to the unlimited duration of the contract. The EU 
law applicable at the time did not formally forbid such unlimited-time 
contracts, so the ECJ needed to accept the principle of their existence.24 It 
could only try to ensure that extensions of contracts or changes in the dura-
tion of contracts did not develop into means of obstructing competition. 
Therefore the ECJ sought to place its decisions within the general objectives 
of EU public procurement; i.e. “to ensure the free movement of services and 
the opening-up to undistorted competition in all the Member States”.25 
Therefore, the general principles of transparency, non-discrimination and 
equal treatment needed to be applied.
In this decision, the ECJ opts for a careful balancing act between the economic 
and legal dimensions of changes. It focuses on the economic effect of the 
changes on the potential distortion of competition; it does not look at the 
legal processes leading up to these changes. Yet it focuses on individual 
changes, one at a time, and does not bundle them in order to compare the 
(22) At [59].
(23) At [80].
(24) At [73] “First of all, as regards the conclusion of a new waiver of the right to terminate the 
contract during the period of validity of a contract concluded for an indefinite period, the Court 
observes that the practice of concluding a public services contract for an indefinite period is in 
itself at odds with the scheme and purpose of the Community rules governing public contracts. 
Such a practice might, over time, impede competition between potential service providers and 
hinder the application of the provisions of Community directives governing advertising of 
procedures for the award of public contracts.”
(25) At [31].
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overall initial contract with the current overall contract. The discussion of the 
substitution and changes in the contracting partner also seems to blur the 
distinction between the legal and economic aspects of changes. Indeed, the 
ECJ renders equivalent to material changes economic modifications in share-
holding which would not amount to legal changes,26 while it discounts as 
material changes the changes in the legal personality when the new contracting 
party retains a strong economic link with the initial contractor.27
Part of the scholarship welcomed the use of flexible notions such as “economic 
balance” because it left scope for the judge to assess whether a change was 
material, i.e. if there had been an intention to substitute a new contract for the 
initial one under the specific circumstances of the case.28 Albeit drafted in a 
pedagogic fashion, the Pressetext decision triggered a range of practical ques-
tions. For instance, the guidelines given obiter dictum on substitution of the 
contracting party through shareholding selling mentioned above were not 
clear and logical.29 Questions were also raised about the practical implemen-
tation of a new tendering process: when does the new procedure start? How 
it should be done? What needs to be retendered?30 The ECJ leaves several 
legal aspects of the changes unexplored. It does not take into account the 
reasons why these changes happen (unforeseen circumstances, recklessness of 
one of the parties, regulatory changes etc.). It does not take into account how 
the change is carried out: by unilateral decision of the public authority or by 
consensus. It does not look at the time when the change happens: a change 
two months after the award seems to require the same treatment as a change 
fifteen years later etc.
In its subsequent decisions, the ECJ maintained the key principles enounced in 
Pressetext, extended them in the case of concessions and specified that 
changing a sub-contractor might amount to substantial modifications if the 
identity of the sub-contractor was a determining factor in the contract being 
awarded to the bidder.31 However, the practical questions related to the appli-
cation of Pressetext remained and clarification of the legal principles was 
needed. The EU proposals to reform procurement attempted to do so.
(26) At [47]-[51].
(27) At [44]-[45].
(28) H.  Hoepffner, “La modification des contrats de la commande publique à l’épreuve du 
droit communautaire”, RFDA, 2011, p. 98.
(29) Ibid., spec. para 29.
(30) J.M.  Helby and P.  Heijnsbroek, “Wezenlijke wijzigingen na Europese aanbesteding”, 
NtEr, april 2012, nr. 3, pp. 94-106.
(31) Wall AG v Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES) GmbH 
(C-91/08) E.C.R. 2010 I-02815 (ECJ).
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§ 3. Searching for principles: competition 
or stability?
The EU proposal related to contractual change did not look for innovation. 
One of the main aims of the reform was to address “a need to clarify basic 
notions and concepts to ensure legal certainty and to incorporate certain 
aspects of related well-established case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union”.32 It mainly looked at the available case law and sought to 
codify it in order to provide legal certainty for economic actors.33 Article 72 
retains the marks of this approach in its wording but the solution provided is 
long-winded. Here, it is worth reproducing the structure of Article 72, divided 
into five paragraphs, before discussing the ambiguities that it causes to arise 
at the level of principles.
Paragraph (1) opens the provision with this statement: “[c]ontracts and frame-
work agreements may be modified without a new procurement procedure in 
accordance with this Directive in any of the following cases”.34 It then 
proceeds by listing five cases, namely:
a) when the initial procurement documents provide for modifications in 
clear, precise and unequivocal review clauses, which may include price 
revision clauses or options;
b) when additional works, services or supplies by the original contractor 
have become necessary and were not included in the initial procurement, 
provided technical and economic requirements are met;
c) in the case of unforeseen circumstances provided that they could not 
have been foreseen by a diligent contracting authority and provided that 
the increase in price is not higher than 50 % of the value of the original 
contract and that the overall nature of the contract is not altered;
d) in the case of substitution of the initial contractor by a new contractor, 1/ 
when the contract provides for the change or 2/ after corporate restruc-
turing provides that the new contractor meets the criteria for qualitative 
selection initially established or 3/ when the contracting authority takes 
over from the initial contractor;
e) for modifications, regardless of their value, that are not substantial. 
Substantial modifications are defined in paragraph (4).
Paragraph (2) adds a sixth case to this list, “small-scale” (de minimis) modifi-
cations; namely, when the modification in the contract value is below the 
thresholds triggering the application of the EU procurement directives and is 
(32) Recital [2] Directive 2014/24 on public procurement [2014] OJ L094/65.
(33) Recital [2] Directive 2014/24.
(34) In the reminder of this paper, framework agreements will not be discussed.
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“10 % of the initial contract value for service and supply contracts and below 
15 % of the initial contract value for works contracts”.
Paragraph (3) explains how increases in price need to be calculated.
Paragraph (4) defines “substantial change” as a modification which “renders 
the contract […] materially different in character from the one initially 
concluded”. It states that at least four situations will be considered as such, 
building strongly on the previous Pressetext case law. These are:
a) modifications which would have altered competition in the initial 
procurement procedure (“the modification introduces conditions which, 
had they been part of the initial procurement procedure, would have 
allowed for the admission of other candidates than those initially selected 
or for the acceptance of a tender other than that originally accepted or 
would have attracted additional participants in the procurement 
procedure”);
b) modifications of the economic balance of the contract;
c) modifications extending the scope of the contract considerably;
d) modifications of the initial contractor which do not fall within the cases 
provided for in article 72 paragraph (1)(d).
Paragraph (5) states that, in all other cases not listed in paragraphs (1) and 
(2), a new procurement competition needs to be organised.
Article 73 Directive 2014/24 provides that the domestic legal system needs to 
make it possible to terminate the contract in cases of substantial modifications 
requiring a new tendering procedure to be opened. If a change is challenged 
and the court finds that it breaches the EU Directive, the contract may be 
declared “ineffective”.
Under Article 72, two sets of ideas regarding the principles that should govern 
changes in the contractual performance cohabit uneasily. On the one hand, 
Article  72 provides for a range of cases insulated from competition and 
re-tendering despite changes being made to the contract: public authorities 
and economic actors keep their freedom to agree on contractual changes. On 
the other hand, it requires new tendering when changes are introduced to the 
contract. It limits the contractual freedom of public authorities and economic 
actors by imposing a situation in which competition frames how contractual 
changes are organised. The overall structure of Article  72 is particularly 
unhelpful as it suggests two possible readings for the principles contained in 
Article 72.
In the first reading of Article 72, the principle is that modifications to contracts 
during performance are possible without a new tendering procedure, the 
exception being “substantial modifications”, which require new tendering. 
This reading could be justified by the fact that the first paragraph starts with 
the lines “[c]ontracts [….] may be modified without a new procurement 
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procedure”. However, this reading is problematic in two ways. First, this very 
line continues with “in any of the following cases”, which would suggest that 
the principle is limited to the very clearly and technically developed five cases 
mentioned in paragraph (1) (and the explicit addition of paragraph (2)). If the 
principle was that in general modifications do not require new tendering 
procedures, why is this not simply written down and why is a list of cases 
added? Secondly, paragraph (5) seems to set out a different principle in the 
form of a default provision, namely “[t]hat a new procurement […] shall be 
required for other modifications of the provisions of a public contract […] 
during its term than those provided under paragraphs 1 and 2”. This seems to 
relegate paragraph (1) to a mere list of exceptions to the principle, following 
which any modification requires a retendering process. However, Treumer 
argues that the list in paragraph (1) should be read as illustrative and that, 
despite the wording, room for other exceptions to paragraph (5) exists.35
In the second reading of Article 72, the principle is that there is a need for 
re-tendering when there are changes, as specified by paragraph (5). According 
to some authors, the general rule contained in Article  72 means that “it is 
forbidden to make a substantial modification to a contract”.36 Paragraphs (1) 
and (2) contain six exceptions to this principle: six cases when modifications 
do not require starting a competitive procedure. Against this reading, one can 
argue that the definition of “substantial modification” is then not required 
because it would be any cases other than the ones listed in paragraphs (1)(a) 
to (d) and (2). A benevolent reading would then be to suggest that paragraph 
(4) is only a reminder of Pressetext as the origin of Article 72, providing a list 
of examples of what may be considered as substantial changes. This list in 
paragraph (4) is thus not expressed in an exhaustive way.
This discussion shows the inconsistency of the drafting of Article 72 because 
the directing principle is not clearly formulated. There are two lists of circum-
stances, one being clearly illustrative (paragraph (4)) and the other less so 
(paragraph (1)). There are two default provisions: one in paragraph (1)(e), 
catching the cases which are not encompassed by paragraph (4), “substantial 
changes” and illustrations, and the other in paragraph (5), catching up all the 
cases not encompassed by paragraphs (1) and (2). Such complexity and inde-
cisiveness thwart the aim of Recital [2] to consolidate case law and bring legal 
certainty into public procurement.
Parties will face changes which do not fall neatly within the cases of para-
graph (1)(a) to (d) and paragraph (2) or within the definition of “substantial 
modification” in paragraph (4). How do they act, then, when they arrive 
(35) S.  Treumer, “Contract changes and the duty to retender under the new EU public 
procurement directive” (2014) P.P.L.R., pp. 148-155, spec. p. 148.
(36) J.  Brodec and V.  Janeček, “How does the substantial modification of a public contract 
affect its legal regime?” (2015) P.P.L.R., pp. 90-105, spec. p. 94.
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within this grey area? Is a duty to retender applicable? Recital [107] may give 
part of the answer as it explains that a new procurement procedure is required 
for changes demonstrating “the parties’ intention to renegotiate essential 
terms of conditions of [the] contract”. However, such an intention can be 
difficult to demonstrate, while the aim of Article 72 had been to clarify when 
new tendering was required.
Circumstances falling into this grey zone would, for instance, include modifi-
cations aiming to address breaches of contract,37 modifications to sub-
contracts or aggregation of changes over time. Successive change is only 
mentioned in relation to successive increases in price and not in relation to a 
variety of other changes (such as in the case of Pressetext). One can think of 
a small-scale increase in price and/or the adoption of new techniques and/or 
changes according to contractual terms and/or changes to the contracting 
partner within the scope of Article  72 paragraph (1)(d) that may all in all 
change the overall contractual performance, alter the essential contractual 
conditions and make it different from what was initially negotiated. The 
system included in Article 72 seems to suggest that the changes should not 
alter the overall substance of the contract. Indeed, this condition is mentioned 
at least twice as a requirement for changes to fall within the scope of Article 72 
paragraph (1).
That these two readings coexist mostly shows the ambiguity of Article  72 
regarding the principles to be applied in cases of changes during contractual 
performance. The EU Commission and the Member States had conflicting 
interests: Article 72 is a composite of their various positions.38 The European 
Commission and interested competitors will find arguments in Article 72 to 
push for extending competition during the contractual performance, while EU 
Member States and public contracting authorities will have a large pool of 
interpretative resources to argue that no duty to retender exists whilst changes 
are carried out. Clarification is thus needed. Domestic courts, the European 
Commission and the European courts will need to flesh out Article 72. Future 
litigation will help to map the applicable principles. Some attention to the 
limits of competition may be useful before we turn, in § 5, to discussing a 
potential alternative to competition and look at roads towards a more 
balanced assessment of the need to use competition to police changes during 
contractual performance.
(37) Treumer, see above (n 35) spec. p. 149.
(38) H. Hoepffner, “L’exécution des marchés publics et des concessions saisie par la concurrence: 
requiem pour la mutabilité des contrats administratifs de la commande publique”, Contrats et 
Marchés publics (France), n° 6, June 2014, dossier 16.
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§ 4. Troubles ahead when extending competition
The implementation of Article 72 Directive 2014/24 will cause trouble because 
its linchpin – “competition” – is replete with difficulties. Adding a competition 
exercise to an already uncertain contractual environment may have costs. 
Although the costs of renegotiations have been recognised in economic theo-
ries, especially in transaction costs theory, for a long time, empirical research 
from an economic perspective is limited on these issues.39 Thorough concrete 
information about the benefits and/or costs of introducing competition in the 
performance stage was thus not available to the European Commission, the 
Member States or the pressure groups answering the European Commission’s 
consultation when Article  72 was discussed. Against this background of 
limited information, this section surveys some of the most obvious issues 
likely to arise from the extension of competition during the performance 
stage. Addressing problems with Article 72 goes beyond clarifying its drafting. 
Further steps in implementation, interpretation, application and advising on 
Article 72 need to map carefully how competition relates to some of the key 
features that contractual changes require.40
I. Comparing competition
The starting point in Pressetext was that public procurement directives seek 
to increase competition in the internal market. Therefore, Pressetext required 
a new award when any practice carried out during contractual performance 
would have had an impact on the potential competition during the bidding 
process. This clearly connected competition in the tendering process with 
competition in the performance stage, meaning that the objectives of the 
Directive were complied with. However, comparing competition when the 
initial contract was agreed with the competition that could have been possible 
with the modified contract is not easily empirically tested: how can the past 
be reconstructed?
(39) H.-J. Priess and S. Saussier, “Re-tendering a contract for breach of procurement rules or 
changes to contract – Dialogue”, in G.  Piga and S.  Treumer (eds), The Applied Law and 
Economics of Public Procurement (Abindgon: Routledge, 2013) pp. 147-162, spec. p. 151 and 
p.  153. For one example of limited research on renegociations, see: J.  Beuve, J.  De Brux 
and S.  Saussier, “Renegotiations, discretion and contract renewals – An empirical analysis of 
public-private agreements”, 2014, available at: http://chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/beuve_et_al._
wp_2014_0.pdf.
(40) For a full technical discussion of the areas where doubts arise: see S. Arrowsmith, The 
Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (Sweet and Maxwell, 2014, 3rd ed) paragraph 6-267 ff.
EU Directive 2014/24 on public procurement  
A new turn for competition in public markets ?
210 larcier
Judges may be used to make hypotheses in public procurement, such as, for 
instance, when a competitor argues that he lost a chance to win a contract due 
to specific irregularities. Changes add layers of complexity, however. It 
becomes a speculative undertaking for a judge or review body to reconstruct 
what competition would have been like when the contract – let us say the 
concession – was awarded four, ten, fifteen or twenty years before. Similarly, 
a judge may grapple with issues in reconstructing competition when there has 
been no competition exercise. This absence may be fully justified under the 
law. For instance, the contract may have been awarded for a price below the 
thresholds but successive changes bring it above the thresholds. Equally, a 
contract may have covered exempted services at first (such as water in the 
Directive 2014/23 concession) but then moved into incorporating regulated 
services.
This difficulty in reconstructing the past is highlighted in a recent UK case, 
Gottlieb,41 where the city council of Winchester entered into a development 
agreement with a developer. There had been no tendering exercise at the 
outset but changes happened across a number of discussions, leading to the 
modification of some spaces into commercial spaces and to reductions in the 
number of affordable housing units and car park spaces. Mr Gottlieb, a resi-
dent of the local area and a city councillor, decided to challenge these changes. 
The judge found that the claimant simply needed to show “on the balance of 
probabilities, that a realistic hypothetical bidder would have applied for the 
contract, had it been advertised, but he is not required to identify actual 
potential bidders”.42 According to the judge, the various changes made the 
contract far more commercially attractive, so these changes had to be seen as 
major.
In the Gottlieb case, the judge was willing to accept probabilities. However, 
public procurement decision making is complex. One of the procurement 
reforms that the UK government has brought forward is pre-procurement 
engagement and early consultation with the market actors.43 Equally, the 
2014 procurement directives seem to accept that this step can be important 
for securing successful procurement. This is so, it is claimed, because one of 
the issues with procurement and its protracted duration is that public authori-
ties do not assess well the options available on the market and the likely 
bidders. If public authorities are not in a good position to do so, how could 
the individual citizen or individual councillor be? Competitors may be in a 
different position to challenge changes during contractual performance. 
However, a risk of opportunism should not be overlooked: would it not be 
(41) R. (on the application of Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin).
(42) At [137].
(43) Efficiency and Reform Group, Procurement Policy Note – Procurement Supporting Growth: 
Supporting Material for Departments, Action Note 04/12, 9 May 2012, annex 2.
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possible for a competitor to come up once a project is going on in a reason-
ably successful way, once the teething issues of the beginning of contractual 
performance, difficulties in securing financing, planning permits etc. are over? 
In many public contracts, risks are lower once buildings have been delivered. 
Changes may happen either during the construction phase or after the 
construction phase but they will happen within a given framework that maps 
far more clearly what is working with the project and what is not working, 
hence altering risk identification and potential risk management. Therefore, 
competitors who did not want to take up the full risks during the procure-
ment could quietly wait to see if opportunities to join a successful project 
arise, such as contractual changes. Such a scenario may depend on specific 
markets and/or countries and/or projects. Yet it highlights that imagining 
what competition might have been should the changes have been integrated in 
the initial bidding process may become a very intricate exercise that is likely 
to need more than probabilities.
II. Proper access to information as a condition 
for competition
For competition to regulate changes in contractual performance, competitors 
need to access information about this contractual performance. Article  72 
provides that notice of changes needs to be published in the official journal of 
the European Union in two cases: 1) when additional works, services or 
supplies have become necessary (article  72 paragraph (1)(b)), and 2) when 
changes becomes necessary following unforeseen circumstances (hypothesis of 
Article  72 paragraph (1)(c)).44 However, in those two cases, no duty to 
retender arises. Therefore, competition and access to information in order to 
police contractual changes trigger at least three problems. Access to informa-
tion is needed but it does not suffice. It needs to be well organised.
First, Article 72 paragraph (4) causes trouble with its organisation: it does not 
require public authorities to publish a notice about substantial changes nego-
tiated between the public authority and the economic actor. The Directive 
does not provide competitors with information related to these substantial 
changes, while these cases are the ones that are interesting to competitors: it 
is clear that a duty to retender exists and that not complying with this duty 
should be open to challenge by competitors if they are willing to bid to gain 
the new award.
Secondly, Article 72 does not answer the problem it is supposed to address. 
The legal issue that it aims to tackle is the one of bad faith entities seeking to 
(44) Article 72 pargapraph (1) in fine.
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circumvent the legal requirements (of transparency, non-discrimination and 
transparency) set for the award phase. Article  72 assumes that compliance 
with these requirements will be monitored in a decentralised fashion: that 
competitors willing to win the contracts will do the necessary investigations 
into public contracts so that they can gather information on the evolution of 
contractual performance and map it against the tender documents. One illus-
tration of this can be found in the case of Pressetext itself, when one compet-
itor sought to break the factual monopoly of a contractual arrangement.
While some competitors may indeed be willing and able to carry out these 
investigations, generalising the assumption and making it the working prin-
ciple of Article  72 is, however, a very long shot. Obstacles abound here. 
Competitors, especially SMEs, may not have the resources to carry out these 
investigations in the first place or may prefer to make use of their resources to 
more productive ends, such as developing their internet website. Only the 
biggest firms may be able to develop entities equipped to carry out these 
investigations in a more or less systematic way. Even then, they will face prac-
tical issues: how will they gain access to the necessary documents? As explained 
earlier, the notice requirements in Article  72 paragraph  (1) only pertain to 
cases when retendering is not required! This means that when retendering is 
legally required, the information will not be publicly available. What are 
competitors supposed to do? Relying on freedom of information regulation 
may not be effective, as the key elements for assessing the need for retendering 
may be protected by commercial confidentiality exceptions in a range of cases, 
such as ones involving the economic balance of a contract. So, organising 
access to information is needed but it needs to be organised for meaningful 
cases of substantial changes as well.
Thirdly, organising access to information is necessary but it does not quite 
fully capture bad faith entities that are purposefully attempting to circumvent 
the application of the EU procurement Directive (as the EU Directive supposes 
is the case). Entities complying with a duty to publish a notice are likely to be 
good faith entities who genuinely face a real need to change their contracts 
during performance. Using competition to police their behaviour (due, for 
instance, to their lack of experience during the award stage or a slightly opti-
mistic assessment of their proportionality test, see below on this in § 5.3) may 
not be the best pedagogic tool for them. What may be needed is better under-
standing and better transparency of changes, what drives them, their context, 
their consequences and their negotiation process, so that gradually this prac-
tice informs judges having to deal with contractual changes, legislators (in the 
broad sense) having to draft appropriate legislation (or guidelines), and other 
public authorities seeking to procure works, goods and supplies. Bad faith 
entities would need to be dealt with through other means, as discussed below 
in § 5.3.
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III. Discontinuity in expectations between procurement 
and performance
At a general level, there is discontinuity between key reforms introduced for 
the award stage by Directive 2014/24  and the ways in which performance 
reflects the older model of procuring public contracts based on relying as 
much as possible on competition in a very economic sense. Reforms related to 
innovation or social and environmental policies are absent from Article 72’s 
wording. This does not mean, however, that such consideration may not have 
a role to play during the performance stage as well. However, this role is kept 
silent in the Directive. This section discusses the case of innovation but similar 
points could be made in relation to horizontal policies.
The Europe 2020 Strategy highlights the importance of public procurement to 
support innovation, and hence to contribute to economic growth within a 
single European market in the making.45 At the centre of innovation are “the 
concepts of imagination and creativity, the intellectual leap that marks a 
development out as progressive rather than ‘business as usual’”.46 Innovation 
has been very much fostered in the new directives.47 Therefore innovation 
needs to receive favourable treatment within the award phase. It is defined in 
a more technical sense as “the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved product, service or process, including but not limited to production, 
building or construction processes, a new marketing method, or a new organi-
sational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external 
relations inter alia with the purpose of helping to solve societal challenges or 
to support the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”.48 It is thus striking that innovation is not mentioned in Article 72 
Directive 2014/24 as a possible justification for triggering changes during 
contractual performance.
It may be argued that innovation needs to be integrated within the contractual 
terms during the award stage. Once a building is built, it is too late to change 
the construction materials to rely on techniques that are friendlier in terms of 
energy use, for instance. Similarly, once highways are built, it becomes diffi-
cult to change their layout to improve road safety.49 It may also be argued 
(45) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020 
Flagship Initiative – Innovation Union, Brussels, 6  October  2010, COM(2010) 546 final, 
pp. 16-17.
(46) Science and Technology Committee, Public procurement as a tool to stimulate innovation 
(2010-2012 HL Paper 148) para 10.
(47) E.g.: Directive 2014/24, recitals [47]-[49]; [95].
(48) Directive 2014/24, article 2 paragraph (1), alinea 22.
(49) My thanks to Professeur Kalflèche for this argument.
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that innovation is mostly addressed in innovation partnerships.50 However, 
two problems arise here. First, the performance of these innovation partner-
ships is not regulated in terms other than those of Article 72. Secondly, inno-
vation partnerships may be focused on highly innovative projects; namely, 
when public authorities have defined a need for an “innovative product, 
service or works that cannot be met by purchasing products, services or works 
already available on the market”.51 What happens with all the not so highly 
innovative products, services or works, where innovation may exist on a 
smaller scale? In short, do we need to have a black and white distinction: 
innovation is dealt with in innovative partnerships and all other projects are 
supposed to be unable to develop innovation?
Circumstances arise when innovation would be possible and welcome in 
nearly any kind of project. Contracting parties learn from the way a contract 
is performed and develop innovative techniques (e.g. to avoid flooding or 
incidents), and integrate new technologies, protocols or methodologies as the 
contract is progressively performed. Regular exchanges with public authori-
ties and daily challenges may need to be acted upon in creative ways. 
Recommendations from audit bodies (such as the National Audit Office52 or 
Cour des comptes) or parliamentary committees investigating the use of 
public monies, such as the Public Accounts Committee in the UK (on the 
project itself or other similar projects), could be implemented in contracts. 
The lack of specific provisions to encourage innovation during contractual 
performance implies that any innovative change needs to fall within one of 
the six grounds providing for the absence of retendering. Recital [111] 
Directive 2014/24 seems to suggest that technological changes need to be 
addressed in “sufficiently clearly drafted review or option clauses”. This may 
indeed work out well but it may also trigger cautious behaviour from risk-
averse contracting parties and does not address the fact that parties’ ability to 
map out potential technological changes may be limited before entering into 
the actual implementation of the contract.
Overall, changes triggered by innovation and new technologies may fall 
within the lists of paragraph 1 (a)-(d) or paragraph (2). However, innovation 
is full of risks and mapping the ways in which a contract may have to be 
adjusted when innovation has been implemented more explicitly (outside the 
specific cases of innovation partnership) may bring to the attention of public 
authorities and economic actors the importance of innovation and the specific 
recognition that this entails. Investment aimed at innovation (even on a small 
scale) needs to be encouraged (and the need for suitable organisation of the 
potential issues that may arise acknowledged). If innovation is a leap of faith 
(50) Directive 2014/24 article 31.
(51) Directive 2014/24 article 31 paragraphe (1) alinea 2.
(52) E.g. NAO, Innovation across central government (12 HC 2008-2009).
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to think outside the box, it does not have to be a huge leap into the deep end. 
The incremental small changes implemented in materials, processes and 
human practices may also help towards the ultimate jump. Competition may 
be a spur in this process but it may also be an obstacle if there is not enough 
legal protection for those entities willing to take this route.
IV. Is competition necessarily equivalent to an efficient use 
of public money?53
The benefit of competition for the good use of taxpayer money needs to be 
looked at carefully. Sue Arrowsmith, for instance, clearly distinguishes the 
competence of the EU to regulate public procurement so that access to market 
is not restricted from the competence of the Member States to decide how 
best to spend their money.54 This distinction between the two aspects of 
competition and value for money has also consequences in the performance 
stage of public contracts. The idea that a new tendering procedure brings new 
bidders interested in tendering for new aspects of contracts also needs to be 
nuanced. Clearly, in some circumstances, such as in the Pressetext case, 
competitors seek to seize opportunities to gain new contracts. However, 
opening an existing contract to competition triggers a series of difficulties and 
questions and may entail economic risks and large costs for contracting 
parties.
First and foremost, a new contract means starting a relationship all over 
again, with all the uncertainty that this entails, while the initial contractor 
may perform the contract in a satisfactory way. It knows the public authority 
and its needs regarding the provision of services, goods or supply. It already 
has the suitable organisation in place, including the administration systems, 
the staff, the technologies, the institutional memory of the project (what has 
been tried, tested, failed, rectified successfully etc.) etc. All this side of it can be 
fairly well ascertained by both the public authority and the incumbent.
A new bidder may come up with fresh ideas, other experiences and/or more 
up-to-date technologies. It may (or may not) accurately assess what it will be 
required to provide. All this side of things is subject to uncertainty as the 
performance of a newcomer is as yet unknown. It may also entail risks, costs 
or loss of expertise. The retendering process may be costly and resource-inten-
sive as the new contract may entail costs associated with a new contractor 
(including risks of challenges), in a way that negotiations may not be. If the 
retendering process leads the public authority to select the incumbent, all the 
costs and energy spent in the tendering process might have been saved by 
(53) Arrowsmith, see above (n 40) paragraph 6-267.
(54) Arrowsmith, see above (n 7) and Kunzlik, see above (n 7).
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savvy negotiations. Re-starting the contract may have benefits both for the 
public authority (if it secures better conditions in some ways or efficiency 
gains) and for the private contactor (for the same reasons). The private 
contractor may also have demonstrated to the public authority that it really 
was the best entity to perform the contract if the public authority was as yet 
unconvinced of this. However, re-starting the contract may have just the 
opposite effects and may sour relationships if the private partner feels 
mistrusted by the public authority. In balancing these advantages and uncer-
tainty, a reasonable and diligent authority may not find retendering to be the 
most “efficient” solution to its needs in adapting the contract. Backing up its 
position with actual comparable data would therefore be hugely useful.
Secondly, the incumbent is in a privileged position as it enjoys an information 
advantage. Retendering the contract needs to take this into account. For the 
retendering process to be meaningful, competitors need to have access to the 
same information as the incumbent. Systems will need to be implemented to 
guarantee this. Case law relating to conflicts of interest between advising 
public authorities and bidding for a contract shows that organising a level 
playing field between an incumbent and potential new bidders may be diffi-
cult for public authorities,55 as well as costly.
Of course, in some circumstances, competition may be a good way to ensure 
that public authorities are not tied up with their current contractor so that 
they can indeed properly negotiate the terms and conditions for changes. In 
other circumstances, if the tendering exercise results in no new bidder for the 
changes, it can just have the opposite effect and put the public authority far 
more at the mercy of the conditions desired by the contractor.
Finally, when a new bidder is awarded the new contract, issues of interfaces 
between the initial and the new contract need to be organised: will the initial 
contract be maintained? If so, how? How will the new contractor relate to the 
initial contractor in terms of access (to premises, infrastructure, services and 
information)? These issues will need to be addressed: it may cost money, 
utilise human resources and leave open questions of liability if something goes 
wrong. All these factors need to be factored into the decision to open up a 
new tendering procedure. If new tendering procedures are required for the 
sake of avoiding the development of monopolies, techniques other than 
imposing competition through public procurement could be developed. 
§ 5 turns to exploring some of the available alternatives.
(55) Arrowsmith, see above (n 40) paragraph 12-137 ff.
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§ 5. Alternatives to competition
Competition as a way to police contractual changes during the contractual 
lifetime may thus have a limited role to play, supportive of a range of other 
techniques which need to be organised. The Directive itself encourages 
contractual planning – which can lead to rigidity and may have adverse effects 
on competition. Implementation and interpretation of the Directive will have 
a crucial role to play. The United Kingdom has opted for guidelines related to 
changes in contracts.56 France also chose to leave the details of Article 72 to 
be transposed “par voie réglementaire”.57 Case law at domestic and European 
levels will also flesh this out. This will need to map out the details of the 
discretion that public authorities enjoy in adapting public contracts. 
Competitors may challenge how contractual changes fall within the contrac-
tual planning required in paragraph (1)(a) and (1)(d). S.  Treumer calls for 
“[n]ational courts and review boards [to] scrutinize such clauses and options 
carefully in order that they do not undermine the duty to retender the contract 
in practice”.58 Options other than contractual planning may need to be devel-
oped, however, to strike a balance between competition and cooperation 
within public contracts. Two such options are briefly surveyed here, although 
they will require further thinking.
I. Contractual planning: a rigid escape strategy
Article 72 Directive 2014/24 sees contractual planning positively: contractual 
terms should reflect the outcome of the competition between bidders during 
the procurement phase. It therefore encourages parties to anticipate their 
future relationships carefully and to embed this planning in their contracts. 
Before the contract is signed, parties need to plan the possible events that may 
arise and cause the parties to decide to modify their agreement. This solution 
offers the most secure means of avoiding the contract having to be retendered. 
Indeed, article 72 paragraph (1)(a) Directive 2014/24 expressly mentions that 
such terms can apply regardless of monetary value. This applies to all kinds of 
changes, including change of contracting party.59 This may be seen as bringing 
good practice into the EU Directives, as many long term and complex public 
contracts already include sophisticated variations mechanisms.60 This incitation 
(56) Crown Commercial Service, The Public Contracts Regulations 2015 – Guidance on 
Amendments to Contracts during their Term, 9 p.
(57) Ordonnance n° 2015-899, 23 July 2015 relative aux marchés publics, article 65.
(58) Treumer, see above (n 35), spec. p. 150.
(59) Directive 2014/24, article 72 paragraph (1)(d)(i).
(60) Hoepffner, see above (n 38).
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goes beyond the normal practice of contractual planning in three respects 
however: first, what needs to be planned; secondly, how it needs to be planned; 
thirdly, when agreement on changes is needed between parties. All these differ-
ences may tighten the freedom and discretion of parties or at least call on them 
to approach contractual planning from a different perspective.
First, contractual planning draws attention to what needs to be planned for. 
Parties’ information on the future is limited because the future is always 
unpredictable to some extent. Parties may try to be as diligent as possible to 
develop contingency plans for a range of circumstances, especially events that 
are known to happen in specific areas or are usual in long-term contracts, 
although outside parties’ control. Here, one can think about strikes and espe-
cially long strikes, rain and fire, sudden high price rises in some materials etc. 
A very important area for changes would be to map how innovative technolo-
gies could lead to changes in contractual performance. It can be burdensome 
for the parties to map ahead all these potential changes for the coming thirty 
years so as to attain the security that they would like to reach. It is not clear 
how far Article  72 could influence actual “good” contractual practice nor 
how “good” general practice in contractual planning is used in all industry 
sectors across all EU Member States. Strikingly, procurements under Directive 
2014/24  and concessions under Directive 2014/23 are subject to the same 
provisions,61 while differences in duration and nature would probably justify 
seeing changes in concessions as a natural way for the contract to evolve, even 
more natural than in public procurement. However, the mere fact that a 
contractual practice becomes encapsulated in the Directive as an escape route 
from the risks of a duty to retender may encourage parties to opt for the safest 
option possible. The duration and costs of the award process would then be 
extended and increased, which does not seem to square with the general aim 
of improving procurement efficiency that Directive 2014/24 seeks to purse.
Secondly, Article 72 specifies how contractual planning needs to happen: for 
the variation clauses to fall within paragraph (1) requirements the contractual 
terms need to be “clear, precise and unequivocal review clauses”. This comes 
from the Pressetext case law. Scholarship has already questioned the interpre-
tation that has to be given of this requirement. For instance, Sue Arrowsmith 
highlights that the variation clauses cannot be a form of blank cheque enabling 
parties to avoid the application of the EU procurement directives.62 English 
judges have explicitly endorsed such an interpretation.63
Thirdly, Article 72 transforms the agreement between parties on changes. So 
far, next to contractually agreed change protocols, changes during public 
(61) The only drafting difference does not address the issue discussed here.
(62) Arrowsmith, see above (n 40) paragraph 6.267.
(63) R. (on the application of Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), 
at [56].
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contracts are also often carried out through a unilateral decision made by the 
public authority. However, this decision reflects a discussion and agreement 
between the parties at one point during contractual performance. In all these 
frequent cases, the unilateral public decision does not come as a surprise to 
the private contractor. Article 72 moves the moment when agreement between 
public and private partners will need to be reached on potential changes 
forward in time: now, this agreement needs to be secured at the time of the 
award in order for the duty to retender not to apply. This makes the whole 
exercise of agreeing more challenging.
There are events that arise outside parties’ planning. Article 72, paragraph (1) 
(c) acknowledges that events arise outside parties’ planning despite them 
having been diligent in the procurement process. Recital [109] specifies that 
this diligence needs to be assessed “taking into account [a contracting author-
ity’s] available means, the nature and characteristics of the specific project, 
good practice in the field in question and the need to ensure an appropriate 
relationship between the resources spent in preparing the award and its fore-
seeable value”. This thus calls for contracting parties to use proportionality in 
assessing the extent of contractual planning that will be best adapted to their 
contracts. § 5.3 comes back to this assessment.
II. Opening up discretion: flexible implementation 
and interpretation
Contractual planning relates to the need to encapsulate public discretion 
adequately, especially regarding the issue of how political considerations 
should be organised in public contracting. The margin of discretion left to 
contracting parties for adapting contracts needs to be further defined by 
domestic implementation and interpretation as well as European case-law.
This question is key to the understanding of “public contracts” and their legal 
consequences. Indeed, domestic legal systems need to find ways to accommo-
date the specificity of the public party in public contracts and recognise 
powers that are not used in private law. This happens regardless of a specific 
legal category, labelled, for instance, “administrative contracts” in the French 
model.64 For this reason, the Pressetext solution and its principle of competi-
tion caused trouble for Member States, which wanted to have protected areas 
in which their public authorities could use their discretion when needed to 
keep public contracts alive and adjusted to changing circumstances. Discretion 
is needed because public authorities are not only pursuing private interests 
(64) M. Fromont, “L’évolution du droit des contrats de l’administration – Différences théoriques 
et convergences de fait”, in R. Noguellou and U. Stelkens (eds), Comparative Law on Public 
Contracts (Bruylant, 2010) pp. 263-278.
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and profit, as economic parties in commercial contracts would be. The diffi-
culty here is to identify how much discretion is helpful for pursuing public 
interests, how it can be exercised and when.
One illustration of this issue can be drawn from a UK recent case. In the 
Edenred case,65 HM Treasury and National Savings and Investments (NS&I) 
wanted, in 2014, to enter into an agreement by which NS&I delivered a 
government policy of tax-free childcare. NS&I, a non-departmental body, is a 
retail savings and investment organisation borrowing money to the govern-
ment’s benefit. In 1999, it outsourced a large part of its operational services 
(such as back office, transaction management, printing, accounting, IT devel-
opment and management etc.) to a private provider. The current outsourcing 
partnership was entered into with Atos in 2013.
In the whole procurement process leading to selecting Atos, NS&I included 
information on the potential expansion of the contract to other departments, 
local government and private sector entities. The notice in the OJCE mentioned 
this expansion, a specific schedule was devoted to managing changes resulting 
from such expansion, and the publication of the award in the OJCE again 
mentioned this potential expansion during the lifetime of the contract. The 
government was interested in using the services provided by NS&I because 
the organisation was already operational, which would enable quick imple-
mentation of its new policy. In order for NS&I to administer the government 
policy of tax-free childcare it became necessary to amend the contract with 
Atos. Two competitors, Edenred and the Childcare Voucher Providers 
Association, challenged this modification on the ground that it would be a 
violation of EU procurement law.
The judge decided that:
“36 […] In short, the question is whether the services were covered by 
the contract resulting from the procurement between 2011 and 2013, 
including its provisions for amendment of the contract. Were it other-
wise, it is difficult to see how a Government department or other public 
body could outsource services that were essential to support its own 
operations and accommodate the occurrence of events and the changes 
of policy that are part of public life. There may be circumstances in 
which a court could conclude that a public authority had designed a 
contract as a means of avoiding its obligations under EU law. In such 
cases the contract might be open to challenge under EU law as an abuse 
of right. But here there is no challenge to the validity of the Atos 
contract itself. Edenred goes no further than to suggest that public 
authorities could use contracts framed in this way as a device for 
(65) Edenred (UK Group) Limited and another v Her Majesty’s Treasury and others [2015] 
UKSC 45.
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avoiding their public procurement obligations by allowing for the 
future provision of unspecified services of a much greater value. 
Whether or not that is so, the focus must be on the particular contract. 
The scale and nature of NS&I’s stated aspirations for the use of its 
infrastructure and other resources in providing B2B services to public 
sector bodies as well as its own retail financial services, which the Atos 
contract was designed to support, appear to be within a reasonable 
compass.”
In this case, the judge acknowledges that changes may be related to avoidance 
but dismisses the idea that the mere possibility of avoidance should lead to 
rejection of changes. Each contract needs to be looked at within its specific 
circumstances to assess whether changes are made according to its economic 
or political logic, and if public authorities are using their discretionary powers 
in accordance with their need to carry out their policies, which can change 
over time. Here the whole procurement process had integrated the possibility 
of expanding the services. There was no question that bidders knew of this 
potential expansion. Therefore, the judge accepted that changes in policy, and 
thus use of public discretion, might have had an impact on agreed contracts. 
Even more so, he accepted that public contracts need to evolve to integrate 
such policy change. This leads to a discussion of how such assessment may 
need to be carried out.
III. Subsidiarity, proportionality and cooperation: 
towards developing assessment strategies 
and compliance monitoring systems
Beyond the implementation and transposition of article 72 Directive 2014/24, 
public authorities need to assess if, how and when changes are required: they 
have a range of tools available, being able to choose between contractual 
planning and discretion, between competition and cooperation. Monitoring 
of how these tools are used needs to be possible, so that distortion of competi-
tion may be prevented. However, it may be useful to see if and how principles 
of subsidiarity66 and proportionality67 that are developed in EU procurement 
case law and in some EU Member States (such as the Netherlands and 
Belgium) could be helpful for a more nuanced identification of when article 72 
Directive 2014/24 does or does not fit the needs of public authorities and their 
contractors, and when competition or discretion may be most suitable. No one 
(66) See especially in Directive 2014/23, recital [87]; Directive 2014/24, recital [136].
(67) See on the principle of proportionality the contribution of Professor P. Kunzlik, “The 2014 
public procurement package – One-step forward and two back for green and social procurement ?”, 
contribution in this edited collection (pp. 139-196).
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single solution may be right. A range of strategies may help to collect informa-
tion about changes and clarify the needs of public parties and economic actors 
alike. Two options spring to mind: an active database and an assessment of 
the required changes.
The first strategy would be to develop a database at domestic or European 
level that could be made available for the kind of changes considered. A public 
authority could then have confidential access to the data related to costs, the 
likely duration of the negotiation or retendering, the supervening issues etc. 
Such data would not only be useful for contractual changes but would surely 
offer concrete benchmarks. The system would need to go beyond a mere 
collection of (outdated and de-contextualised) data and figures but should be 
organised in such a way as to make it live and build a community of procurers 
across the EU, sharing experience with colleagues dealing with similar issues. 
For instance, a public authority which awarded a concession for water sewage 
twenty years ago may need to upgrade the technologies and methodologies to 
comply with new EU water directives. It may need to have access to compa-
rable information, which may only be available in other EU Member States. If 
public authorities may, more or less, have access to similar information within 
their own country (which is not that straightforward), economic actors are 
likely to have that information on their side. For some sectors, there are only 
a very limited number of economic actors acting across the EU Member 
States. Consultancies and experts may have developed such databases or may 
be hired to provide this kind of information. It may, however, be the kind of 
data that should be at the core of public missions and it may need to be gath-
ered in an independent way so as to ensure that public purchasing is truly 
informed, and thus made efficient.
This should not be seen as an additional bureaucratic burden but as a welcome 
measure of openness – once the terms of transparency are carefully designed. 
We are not talking here of general openness for all citizens but, in the first 
place, about information sharing in an honest, open and cooperative manner 
across Europe. This could be done step by step, between a few key Member 
States, first targeting some key sectors (such as highways, water services or 
IT), with more or less support from the European Commission, and then 
extended to all Member States and more sectors.
A second strategy for approaching contractual changes would be to ask public 
authorities to engage in an assessment of the modifications to be performed, 
including an audit of the possible costs, and to do a market study providing 
them with a realistic idea of the competition. A robust procedure regarding 
the information communicated to potential bidders and their commitment to 
engaging in a tendering procedure under the conditions they would offer if it 
was opened would need to be developed.
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§ 6. A call for more imagination, transparency 
and justification
In analysing the approach to contractual changes adopted by article  72 
Directive 2014/24, this paper argued that competition was part of the solu-
tion but only a part, and that there was a risk of Article 72 making it part of 
the problem as well. Once a public contract has been agreed, public authori-
ties face a range of possibilities. Public authorities and private contractors 
may thus be placed along a very long spectrum of configurations.
At one extreme, public authorities and private contractors may seek changes 
that were actually intended during the whole procurement process just to 
circumvent the public procurement regulations. These would be “bad faith” 
entities. The solution of Article  72 is intended to prevent them reaping the 
rewards of their distortion of competition. In this case, re-opening of the 
tendering process is logical as the first tendering was not really transparent, 
equal and honest. However, in that case, decentralised control may be needed 
yet not sufficient. Other monitoring mechanisms at domestic or European 
level would be required to ensure that the objectives of the procurement direc-
tives and competition are met.
At the other extreme, a public authority and its contracting partner may 
accept that a duty to retender has arisen from changes they are contemplating. 
However, they ponder the costs, risks, durations, challenges, interfaces and 
confidentiality terms that this retendering will cause. The public authority 
wonders how a new contractor will be able to take over, and an economic 
actor may reconsider the investments it has made over the years in this specific 
project. Was it really worthwhile? What lessons can be drawn for other such 
projects? The retendering process may be more or less successful, the outcome 
more or less in line with parties’ expectations. In some cases, at least, competi-
tion may not be the most efficient and economically advantageous route, 
albeit the legal framework requires it to be done.
Between these two extreme cases there is a variety of situations in which 
“competition” may be needed and bring more experienced, innovative and 
efficient solutions to the changing needs of public authorities and their 
projects. However, this paper has argued that competition is not a “one-size-
fits-it-all” solution. A more sophisticated assessment of the initial bidding 
process, developments in the contractual relationships and the potential future 
of the contracts after amendments for the parties, as well as potential market 
competitors and users, need to be developed so that economic, social and 
environmental interests are also integrated during the performance stage.
The new directives are starting to recognise that competition only plays one 
part in the procurement of contracts: other considerations have been 
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integrated so that the whole awarding process is becoming more flexible and 
hopefully efficient in the use of public monies. This paper has demonstrated 
that a similar evolution is needed at the level of the performance stage in 
general, and especially when it comes to contractual changes.
Simplification is not achieved with a single ambiguous provision. Simplification 
may require the development of two kinds of tools. First, some key legal prin-
ciples may need to be applied in the performance stage, mapping how public 
discretion may make its assessment and choice between negotiations with the 
incumbent and retendering. Secondly, some institutional control over compli-
ance with these principles needs to be organised – such as a transparent justi-
fication of the outcome of the assessment, the development of databases as 
means of providing live information about such assessment, and monitoring 
of how changes are actually carried out. This may be a long way from using 
contractual planning as an escape strategy. However, contractual planning has 
also a role to play in this picture as it can be a very useful map for parties in 
specifying their needs, expectations, commitments for the management of the 
relationship, and a benchmark for any supervening event.
Overall, designing suitable regulation for changes in the performance stage of 
procurement thus contributes to the on-going debates about the role of the 
law in the market and the functions that states have to provide within the 
economy. This paper thus hopes that such design could be made more attuned 
to economic realities thanks to further empirical research in economic terms 
assessing the benefits of competition and cooperation for economic growth, 
competition and the good use of taxpayer’s money. Once more robust infor-
mation became available, informed discussions about the level – European, 
domestic or a combination – at which this design would be best conducted 
would then be possible. For the moment, the political compromise struck 
during the negotiations leading up to Directive 2014/24 is lacking a coherent, 
logic and convincing economic, political or social rationale: the objectives of 
legal certainty and simplification are further away than ever.
